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INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Abraham & Associates Trust (Michael Robert Barker, Trustee) appeals
from the trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered March 8, 2010
herein, finding that Plaintiff has no easement, right-of-way, or means of access between a
landlocked parcel of real property located in Kane County, State of Utah, and an adjacent
public road (Appendix at Attachment 1); further, from the court's entry of judgment
based on its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, entered April 21, 2010 (Appendix
at Attachment 2); finally, from the court's denial of Plaintiff s Motion for New Trial,
dated January 1, 2011 (Appendix at Attachment 3). Plaintiff?Appellant's Notice of
Appeal was filed with the trial court on January 4, 2011 (Appendix at Attachment 4), but
contained a typographical error; and Amended Notice of Appeal was filed January 24,
2011 (Appendix at Attachment 5).
The trial court's Findings and Conclusions, Judgment and Order Denying Motion
for New Trial all followed a bench trial in this matter on January 26, 2010. Therein,
Plaintiff contended that its property, isolated from the adjacent county road by numerous
parcels of real property once held in unity of title by a common grantor, was entitled to a
declaration of easement by necessity. In the alternative, Plaintiff sought an order of the
court reforming deeds to adjacent properties to reflect an express easement thereon.
During trial, Plaintiff established by unrefuted evidence that its property, as well as those
lying between that property and the adjacent county road, had once been held in unity of
title by common grantors; further, that an easement by necessity was necessary in order
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to afford Plaintiff reasonable access to its property from the adjacent county road.
Testimony was conflicting concerning whether there existed an alternate physical means
of access between Plaintiffs property and the adjacent county road; it was undisputed,
though, that no legal right-of-way existed, thus necessitating trespass by Plaintiff for
access. The only evidence concerning a legal right-of-way came in the form of a
reservation of right-of-way on a separate deed, reserving an easement across the southern
portion of the property conveyed; however, no evidence of any conveyance of that
reserved right-of-way to Plaintiff or its predecessors-in-interest was presented to the trial
court.
Nevertheless, the trial court found that (1) Plaintiff had failed to establish a case
for easement by necessity, in that it produced no living witness able to testify that, at the
moment of severance, the easement by necessity was obvious and in existence. The court
further found that, in conveying title to an adjacent parcel of property subject to a
reservation of easement, Plaintiffs remote grantors "intended" to grant an easement in
favor of Plaintiff s predecessors-in-interest to its property. The court concluded,
however, that Plaintiff had failed to produce competent evidence establishing its remote
grantors' intent to place the reservation of easement on Plaintiffs property (and those
properties lying between Plaintiffs property and the adjacent county road), disregarding
completely the fact that (1) the reservation of easement on the adjacent property was
nonsensical in that that parcel flanks the county road on its eastern border and requires no
easement or right-of-way to the adjacent county road; and (2) by placing the reservation
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of easement on the adjacent property, Plaintiffs remote grantors landlocked Plaintiffs
property.
In fact, the trial court's ruling impermissibly and improperly leaves Plaintiffs
property without access to or from the outside world, either through reformation of
necessary instruments of conveyance to recognize the intent and preservation of an
express easement, or through the imposition of easement by necessity. It is clearly
against the policy of the law to leave real property without any reasonable means of
access to the outside world, thus rendering it unusable.
Upon entry of final judgment by the trial court on Wednesday, April 21, 2010,
Plaintiff prepared and filed a Motion for New Trial under Rule 59, Utah R. Civ. P., which
motion was filed and served Monday, May 3, 2010. Briefing was completed by May 17,
2010, and the matter submitted on May 19, 2010. The court scheduled no hearing until
November 4, 2010. Thereafter, on January 3, 2011, the court issued an order denying
Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial as having been untimely filed (Appendix at Attachment
3). In fact, the motion was timely filed under any interpretation of Rule 6, Utah R.
Civ. P., and should have been considered on its face; moreover, this denial for the reasons
articulated by the trial court should not be deemed to make Plaintiffs appeal to this Court
untimely.
JURISDICTIONAL BASIS FOR APPEAL
This is an appeal from a final order and judgment of the Sixth Judicial District
Court for Kane County, State of Utah, denying Plaintiffs request for easement rights

<mi7i 1
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across Defendants' property to the adjacent county road. Appeal was initially taken to
the Supreme Court for the State of Utah, which thereafter assigned the matter to the Utah
Court of Appeals. Jurisdiction obtains pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1,

Whether the trial court erred in holding that Plaintiff's Motion for New

Trial was untimely under Rule 59, Utah R. Civ. P., even though (1) Judgment was entered
Wednesday, April 21, 2010; (2) Plaintiff filed its Motion for New Trial on Monday, May
3, 2010; and (3) Rule 6, Utah R. Civ. P. provides that (a) when a filing period is less than
11 days, intervening Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays shall be excluded from the
computation, and (b) when the last day of a period falls on a Saturday, Sunday or legal
holiday, the period is extended to the next day which is not a Saturday, Sunday or legal
holiday. This is a question of law, reviewed for correctness - Burgers v. Maiben, 652
P.2d 1320 (Utah 1982).
2,

Whether the trial court erred in failing to find the existence of an easement

by necessity between Plaintiff's property, located in Kane County, Utah, and an adjacent
public right-of-way. The Court's Findings of Fact are reviewed for clear error; its
interpretation and application of the law of easements by necessity is reviewed for
correctness. Cowley v. Porter, 2005 UT App. 518, 127 P.3d 1224; Parduhn v. Bennett,
2005UT22, 112P.3d495.
3,

Whether the trial court erred in finding an "intent" on the part of Plaintiff's

remote grantors (who did not testify at trial) to grant to Plaintiff's predecessors in interest
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an express easement for access to and from Plaintiff's property along an adjacent
property. The Court's Findings, Conclusions and Judgment are reviewed for clear error.
Cowley v. Porter, 2005 UT App. 518, 127 P.3d 1224; Parduhn v. Bennett, 2005 UT 22,
112P.3d495.
4.

Whether the trial court erred in refusing to reform the warranty deed dated

August 12,1985, from Idona J. Smith to Paul R. Harris and Gina L. Harris, recorded at
Entry 55612, Book 86, Pages 454-455, Office of the County Recorder for Kane County,
State of Utah, as well as the warranty deed dated April 16, 2001, from Paul R. Harris and
Gina L. Harris to James M. Park and Tori L. Park, recorded as Entry No. 205769, Book
207, Page 32, Office of the County Recorder for Kane County, State of Utah (Appendix
at Attachment 13) to reflect an express easement thereon. The court's Findings,
Conclusions and Judgment in this regard are reviewed for clear error - Cowley v. Porter,
2005 UT App. 518, 127 P.3d 1224; Parduhn v. Bennett, 2005 UT 22, 112 P.3d 495.
CITATION OF DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES
1.

Utah Code Ann. §25-5-1.

2.

Rule 6(a), Utah R. Civ. P.

3.

Rule 59(b), Utah R. Civ. P.

4.

Low v. City of Monticello, 2002 UT 90, 54 P.3d 1153.

5.

Panos v. Olsen & Associates Construction, Inc., 2005 UT App. 446, 123
P.3d816.

6.

Tschaggeny v. Union Pacific Land Resources Corporation, 555 P.2d 277
(Utah 1976).
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff Abraham & Associates Trust is the owner of a parcel of real property in
Kane County, State of Utah, situated to the east of County Road K-2000, and inaccessible
from any adjacent public right-of-way. Plaintiff filed this action on April 3, 2006 (R. 111) seeking a declaration of easement and right-of-way across two parcels of real
property lying between Plaintiffs property and the adjacent public road, which properties
belong, respectively, to James M. Park and Tori L. Park, and to Dennis Carr and Donette
Carr.
On August 14, 2006, Plaintiff moved the court for summary judgment (R. 35-37).
In response, Defendants Dennis and Donette Carr stipulated to a decree of quiet title,
granting to Plaintiff an express easement across their property (R. 83-86). Based on the
parties' stipulation and motion, the court entered an order of quiet title and dismissal with
respect to the Carr Defendants on October 6, 2006 (R. 149-152). Defendants James M.
Park and Tori L. Park, however, resisted Plaintiffs motion. By Memorandum Decision
dated November 28, 2006 (R. 156-163), the trial court expressly found the fundamental
facts underlying Plaintiffs claim of easement by necessity; the trial court concluded,
however, that Plaintiff had failed to establish, as a matter of law, that access across the
Parks Defendants' property was "reasonably necessary" to the use and enjoyment of
Plaintiff s property.
On February 23, 2007, Plaintiff renewed its motion for summary judgment,
submitting additional evidence concerning the reasonable necessity of easement rights
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between its property and the adjacent county road (R. 164-166). The Park Defendants
responded with their own motion for summary judgment (R. 253-255), even though the
Park motion had been untimely filed under the court's scheduling order (R. 66-69).
Given the parties' respective contentions concerning the physical access problems to the
properties at issue, Plaintiff also moved the Court to conduct a site view (R. 238-240)
The court scheduled argument of both motions for November 2, 2007 (R. 392-394). On
January 14, 2008, the court issued its decision, again holding that a question of fact
existed concerning the "reasonable necessity" of Plaintiff s proposed easement across the
Park Defendants' property, yet declining a site view (R. 400-405).
This matter was tried to the court on January 26, 2010 (R. 625-626). Following a
presentation of evidence and argument of counsel, the court took the matter under
advisement.
On March 8, 2010, the court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
(R. 627-639; Appendix at Attachment 1). In its Findings, the Court acknowledged the
following:
a.

That, prior to August 1, 1964, Bertrand C. Smith and Idona J. Smith
owned the properties identified in the evidence (and below in the
Statement of Facts) as the North Property, the Watson Property, the
Trust Property, the Carr Property and the Park Property as a single
parcel (Findings of Fact at ^ 3);

b.

That the single parcel had been accessed via a county road which
bordered the parcel and past through portions thereof (Findings of
Fact No. 4);

c.

That, on August 1, 1964, the Smiths conveyed a portion of the
parcel, and retained the balance (Findings of Fact at Yf 5 and 6);
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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d.

That a portion of the Smith's property conveyed to RKR was
thereafter divided among Grantees B. Gary Smith, Gary K. Watson
and Oliver D. LeFevre, who in turn partitioned the Watson Property,
the Trust Property and the Carr Property (granting each other
reciprocal easement rights for access thereto) (Findings of Fact at fflf
7-13);

e.

That the Park Property was retained by Smiths, and conveyed by
Paul and Gina Harris to Defendants in 2001 (Findings of Fact at ^
15).

At paragraph 18, the Court summarized all testimony offered by Defendant at trial
concerning physical means of access between the Trust Property and the adjacent county
road; at no point, however, did the Court find that any alternate access route between the
Trust Property and the county road (whether physically passable or not) did not constitute
trespass over private lands owned by non-parties to the lawsuit.
At Conclusion of Law No. 4, the Court concluded that Plaintiff had not established
a right to easement by necessity based on the following:
a.

"No witness testified as to conditions existent on August 1, 1964; the
date of severance;

b.

"The Court is unaware as to whether there was a road from the Trust
Property to the outer world as of August 1, 1964;

c.

"Presumably no witness with knowledge or other evidence was
available to the trust regarding the conditions on the ground 45 years
ago; at the time the Smiths' severed the Park property from the
property it sold to RKR;

d.

"The Court thus cannot make a finding as to whether the 80-acre
parcel originally conveyed to RKR (of which the Trust Property is a
part) was land locked at the time of severance;

e.

"Because the trust is the plaintiff in this action it bears the burden of
proof;

i
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f.

"In the absence of such evidence this court is required to rule in
favor of the Parks on that issue;

g.

"Under Utah law an easement by necessity is not created 'clearly
appears that the parties to the conveyance did not intend such an
easement.' [citing governing case law, more fully addressed below];

h.

"In this case Deed ; B ' contained a grant of a 30-foot easement from
the county road across the 240-acre RKR parcel to the northwest
corner of the parcel conveyed in Deed C B';

i.

"Because at the time of severance there were two deeds from the
Smiths to RKR (Deed 'A' and Deed 'B') rather than just one; and
because the land in Deed ; B ' was on the same day subsequently
conveyed to the three individuals (B. Gary Smith, Gary K. Watson
and Oliver D. LeFevre); and because the 30-foot easement granted in
Deed 'B' went to the northwest comer of the property conveyed in
Deed 'B', Deed 'B' evidences clear intent on the part of the parties
to the severance that the express easement granted in deed 'B 5 was
the intended means of access to the 80-acre parcel conveyed in Deed
6
B\"

(Conclusion of Law No. 4).
Judgment was thereafter entered on Wednesday, April 21, 2010 (R. 647-650;
Appendix at Attachment 2). On Monday, May 3, 2010, Plaintiff filed a Motion and
Memorandum for New Trial (R. 651-719). Following briefing, Plaintiff filed a Notice of
Request for Ruling on May 21, 2010 (R. 734-736), and again on September 9, 2010
(R. 737). The court scheduled the matter for oral argument on November 4, 2010
(R. 738); thereafter on January 3, 2011, the court denied Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial
as having been filed untimely (R. 739-741).
Plaintiff filed its Notice of Appeal on January 7, 2011 (R. 742-743; Appendix at
Attachment 4); it amended its notice of appeal on January 26, 2011 (R. 744-746;
Appendix at Attachment 5).
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STATEMENT OF FACTS1
A.

Facts Admitted Prior to Trial.
Prior to trial, and pursuant to dispositive motions filed by Plaintiff as well as facts

admitted in discovery (all as presented at trial - see TR at 22-24), the following facts
were established as uncontroverted:
1.

Plaintiff owns a parcel of land located in Kane County, Utah. Hereinafter,

this property is referred to as 'the Trust Property.5
2.

Defendants Dennis Carr and Donette Carr ("the Carrs") also own a parcel

of land located in Kane County, Utah. This property is referred to as 'the Carr Property.'
3.

Defendants James M. Park and Tori L. Park ("the Parks55) are owners of a

parcel of land located in Kane County, Utah. This property is referred to as 'the Park
Property.5
4.

The Trust Property, the Carr Property, and the Park Property form three

contiguous parcels of land located to the west of Kane County Road No. K-2000
('County Road5):
a.

The Park Property is immediately adjacent to the County Road.

b.

The Carr Property is located to the west of the Park Property.

c.

The Trust Property is located to the west of the Carr and the Park

Properties.

1

5
References to pages of the trial transcript (R. 747) appear as "TR at
\ Trial exhibits
were numbered sequentially without distinction as to their receipt from plaintiff or
5
defendant, and are indicated as "Exh.
\
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The layout of the three properties vis-a-vis each other and the USGS map of the region
was illustrated on Exhibits 1-3 (TR at 30-35). Copies of Exhs. 1-3 are included in the
Appendix at Attachments 6-8.
5.

Prior to August 1, 1964, the Trust, the Carr, and the Park Properties were all

owned in fee simple by Bertrand C. Smith and Idona J. Smith ('the Smiths').
6.

Later, the Properties were conveyed to other owners. There were a number

of transfers over the years.
7.

Plaintiff became the owner of the Trust Property on August 2, 2006.

8.

On December 21, 1965, the then-owners of the Carr Property conveyed an

easement across their property to the then-owners of the Trust Property. (See Right-ofWay Deed between Gary Smith and Barbara G. Smith as grantors and Oliver D. LeFevre
and Gary K. Watson as grantees.)
B.

Facts Adduced at Trial.
At trial on January 26, 2010, testimony established the following additional facts:
1.

Plaintiff Abraham & Associates Trust is a trust organized and existing under

the laws of the State of Utah. Plaintiff is currently the holder of primary beneficial
interest in and to the Trust Property, conveyed to the trust's creator, S. Mark Hulet, in
exchange for professional services, and thereafter conveyed by mesne conveyances to the
trust. TR at 26-28, 34-37, 44-48 and Exhs. 16-23.
2.

Prior to August 1, 1964, title in and to the Park Property, the Carr Property

and the Trust Property (as well as a parcel to the west of the Trust Parcel later deeded to
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Mr. Gary K. Watson, hereafter "Watson Property") were held in fee simple interest
absolute by Bertrand C. Smith and Idona J. Smith (hereafter "Smiths"). TR at 23. On
that date, however, Smiths conveyed to RKR Construction Company all of their right,
title and interest in and to the Trust Property, the Watson Property and the Carr Property
by deed of that date, recorded February 13, 1965 as Entry No. 00396, Book 015, Page
396, Kane County Recorder ("RKR Deed"). TR at 37-38 and Exh. 4.
3.

On the same date that the RKR Deed executed, Smiths conveyed to RKR

Construction Company all of their right, title and interest in and to the parcel of land to
the north of the Trust Property, the Watson Property and the Carr Property by deed
recorded April 29, 1965 as Entry No. 00030, Book 016, Page 30, Kane County Recorder
("RKR North Deed"). TR at 73-75 and Exh. 27.
4.

The RKR North Deed was made "subject to a 30 foot right-of-way from the

Kane County Road to the NW corner of the N lA of the SW 1/4, Section 19, Township 38
S, Range 8 W. Exh. 4.
5.

While, as drafted, the RKR North Deed is made subject to the described

right-of-way, nothing in the RKR Deed (or in any subsequent conveyances of the
property described therein) gives that property benefit of the right-of-way. Exhs. 4 and
27.
6.

In reviewing the two deeds, the following facts are apparent from their face:
a.

Both deeds were prepared and signed on the same day, before the

same notary;
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b.

The right-of-way is described from calls within the southwest

quarter of Section 19 where the property deed by the RKR Deed is located, rather
than from the northwest quarter of the section, where the property deeded by the
RKR North Deed is located;
c.

Access over the southernmost 30 feet of the property described in

the RKR North deed is impassible (see below); and
d.

The property described in the RKR Deed is not adjacent to County

Road K-2000, is landlocked, and has need of a right-of-way to access the public
road; the property described by the RKR North Deed, by contrast, is adjacent to
the county road, and requires no access thereto.
TR at 74-79 and Exhs. 4 and 27.
7.

By deed recorded January 10, 1965, RKR Construction Company conveyed

all of its right, title and interest in and to the Carr Property, the Trust Property and the
Watson Property to B. Gary Smith, Gary K. Watson and Oliver D. LeFevre, as tenants-incommon of all three properties. TR at 39 and Exh. 5.
8.

The three transferees under this conveyance then quit claimed their

respective interests in and to portions of the conveyed property, such that Oliver D.
LeFevre became sole owner, in fee simple absolute, of the Trust Property; B. Gary Smith
became sole owner, in fee simple absolute, of the Carr Property; and Gary K. Watson
became sole owner, in fee simple absolute, of the Watson Property. TR at 40 and
Exhs. 6-8.

071171 1
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9.

Said transferees further conveyed to each other reciprocal easement rights

over and across their respective parcels of property for the benefit of their neighboring
landowners. TR at 41 and Exhs. 9-11.
10.

By stipulation, Plaintiff and the Carr Defendants have agreed that Plaintiff

holds an express easement across the northernmost 30 feet of the Carr Property pursuant
to Exh. 10, and this Court has entered an order and judgment quieting title in and to that
easement in favor of Plaintiff ("Carr Property Easement"). R. 83-86, 149-152.
11.

As noted above, through mesne conveyances, the Trust succeeded to

primary beneficial interest in and to the Trust Property by deed dated August 2, 2006 (TR
at 43-48 and Exhs. 15-23), and the Carr Defendants succeeded to primary beneficial
interest in and to the Carr Property - TR at 49-50 and Exh. 24.
12.

Defendant Donette Carr is daughter to Bud Allen, Carrs' grantor of the Carr

Property under Quitclaim Deed dated April 6, 1998, recorded August 21, 1998 as Entry
»
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No. 95443, Book 0176, Pages 682-683, Kane County Recorder. TR at 49, 102-103 and
Exh. 24.
13.

In August of 1985, Idona J. Smith (then the sole surviving interest holder in

and to the Park Property) conveyed all of her right, title and interest in and to the Park
Property to Paul and Gina Harris. Said conveyance was by warranty deed dated
August 12, 1985, and was recorded August 22, 1985 at Entry No. 55614, Book 086,
Pages 454-455, Kane County Recorder ("Harris Deed"). TR at 42 and Exh. 12.
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14.

In 1970, Bud Allen (then owner of the Carr Property - see Paragraphs 19-

20, above)) purchased a 30-foot-wide easement and right-of-way from the Idona R.
Smith, Bertrand Gary Smith, Luna Diane Smith Mitchell, Sylvia Karen Smith Bullock
and lone J. Lambert (who at that time still held primary beneficial interest in and to the
Park Property) across the northernmost thirty feet of the Park Property to its common
border with the Carr Property. Said right-of-way was more particularly described as
follows:
Beginning at the center of Section 19, T38S, R8W, SLB&M, thence N
89°43f E 1151.7 ft.; thence S 0°17' E 30.0 ft.; thence S 89°43f W 1151.7
feet; thence N 0°17' W 30.0 ft. to the point of beginning and containing
0.793 acres more or less.
("Park Property Easement55). TR at 42 and Exh. 14.
15.

Mr. Allen's conveyance, however, was restricted to use by his family and

invitees (including his daughter, Defendant Donette Carr - see Paragraph 12, above).
Exh. 14.
16.

On April 16, 2001, Harrises conveyed their rights in and to the Park

Property to James M. Park and Tori L. Park. Said conveyance was by warranty deed
dated April 16, 2001, and was recorded April 25, 2001 at Entry No. 105769, Book 0207,
Pages 32-33, Kane County Recorder ("Park Deed55). TR at 42, 100 and Exh. 13.
17.

The Park Property Easement is occupied by a graded dirt road providing

physical access to the Park Property, the Carr Property, the Trust Property and the Watson
Property. TR at 51-52, 101-103 and Exh. 25. The road is currently level and straight,

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

15

providing access across the Park Property to the Carr Property. Exh. 25 at pp. 00870105.
18.

There was some dispute about when the road along the Park Property

Easement was first installed, with Defendant James Park and witness John Eckert
recalling its construction by Bud Allen in 1979-1980 (TR at 104, 144-145), and witness
Donald Stucker remembering use of the road in the mid-1970s (TR at 118-119). It was
undisputed, though, that the road needed to be built up due to the rutted, marshy quality
of the ground surrounding it by virtue of natural springs. TR at 58-59, 122 and Exh. 25.
19.

Plaintiffs representative, S. Mark Hulet, testified - repeatedly and without

objection - that he had searched the record of the Trust Property, the Park Property, the
RKR Property, and adjacent properties, and had discovered no legal right of access to the
Trust Property via the adjacent county road, existing at any time after Smith's conveyed
away the Trust Property, the North Property, the Carr Property, and the Park Property. TR
at 50, 62, 72-73, 82-83, 96.
20.

Trust representative Mark Hulet acknowledged on cross-examination, in

fact, that in order to approach the Trust Properly on foot across the RKR Property to the
north, he had been compelled to trespass. TRat96.
21.

Defendants produced no evidence whatever controverting the lack of legal

access to and from the Trust Property after August 1, 1964. Defendant James Park, in
fact, acknowledged on cross-examination that, in approaching the Carr and Trust
Properties over the RKR property to the north (for purposes of demonstrating that access
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16

m i n i

1

to the Trust Property was physically possible over the RKR property - see Paragraph 33,
below), he had been compelled to trespass. TR at 137.
22.

Mr. Park further acknowledged on cross-examination that he knew of no

legal avenue of access to the Trust Property from the adjacent county road over properties
other than the Park Property Easement. TR at 139.
23.

According to testimony of Plaintiff's representative, Mark Hulet, access to

the trust property over the RKR property, at present, encounters the obstacles for which
the road across the Park property easement was created - deep washes where earth had
washed to a depth of three or four feet due to groundwater and spring conditions. TR at
58-59, and Exhs 3 and 25 pp. 0093-0107.
24.

Other access points across the RKR property to the north encounter

marshland through which no vehicle can be driven. TR at 60 and Exh. 3.
25.

According to Mr. Hulet, while ATV vehicle travel across the RKR property

to the Carr and Trust properties is possible, it is "dangerous, because there's drainage
from that marshland." TR at 60-64 and Exh. 25 at pp. 0101-0109.
26.

Defendants attempted to introduce photographic evidence that a pathway

across sections of the RKR North Property resulted in a feasible alternative to use of the
Park Property easement; these photographs, however, omitted sections of the proposed
road which were impassible due to ground conditions. TR at 159-162, Defendants
offered no rebuttal when this tactic was exposed. TR at 162.
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27.

Mr. Hulet further testified that access from the west of the Trust property

encountered steep grades which rendered their use unfeasible. TR at 64-67 and Exhs. 3
and 25, pp. 0112-0115.
28.

In attempting to access the Trust property from the south, Mr. Hulet

encountered a locked gate below an unimproved switchback road, portions of which
washed out over time, over property known as "North Fork Estates". TR at 68-72 and
Exh. 3. (As noted at Paragraph 27 above, Plaintiff has no right of legal access across any
property within the North Fork Estates - TR at 72.)
29.

Witness Donald Stucker confirmed at the ATV road through North Fork

Estates to the Trust Property was infeasible to grade and conditions; further, that a locked
gate had been installed at its southern end. TR at 120-121, 123.
30.

Witness John Eckert testified that, at sometime in the past, a road had been

created past a cabin on the RKR North Property, by which the Trust Property was
accessible; Mr. Eckert acknowledged, however, that RKR had long since barred and
forbidden access along this road. TR at 147-148.
31.

Mr. Eckert likewise testified that access to the Trust Property had at one

time been available through property once belonging to Mack Wood, and later to a Dr.
Martin; Mr. Eckert acknowledged, however, that logging operations of adjacent
properties have rendered this road completely unusable. TR at 148-149, 153-154. In
addition, Mr. Eckert testified that Dr. Martin had barred access across his property. TR at
149-150.
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C.

Marshaling of Evidence.
1.

The RKR North Deed (Exh. 27) contains a reservation of easement in the

following words:
Subject to a 30 foot right-of-way from the Kane County Road to the NW
corner of the N V2 half of the SW %, Section 19, Township 38 S, Range
8W.
2.

Witness Donald Stucker testified of the existence and one-time usability of

a road to the Trust Property through North Fork Estates. TR at 120-123 (see, however,
Paragraph 29, above).
3.

John Eckert testified of additional roads to the Trust Property across the

RKR North Property, which were later blocked. TR at 148-154.
4.

Defendant James Park testified that, when he purchased the Park Property

in 2001, he found the road across the Park Property Easement in existence, but impassible
- that he had to cut down trees in the summer of 2001-2002 to make the road passable.
TR at 101-103.
5.

Trust representative S. Mark Hulet confirmed Mr. Stucker5s testimony that

the ATV switchback road up from North Fork Estates had become impassible except by
ATV. TR at 68-72.
6.

The roadway crossing the Park Property Easement has not been graded or

improved all the way to the Trust Property, and would require additional engineering and
grading work. TR at 92-94. (It was undisputed, though, that the existing road extended
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to the edge of Plaintiff s stipulated easement across the Carr Property - TR at 53-58 and
Exh.25, pages 0087-0105.
7.

Defendant Park testified that, on one day, he had travelled across the RKR

North Property from a point north of the junction between County Road K 2000 and the
Park Property Easement to a point on the Carr Property Easement, and presented
photographs of portions of the route. TR at 129-135 and Exhs. 28-43. (But see
Paragraph 26, above.)
8.

No witness at trial testified as to the necessity of an access easement

between the Trust Property and the adjacent county road on August 1, 1964, there being
no living individual available to so testify.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court improperly concluded that Plaintiffs motion for new trial, served
and filed on May 3, 2010, was untimely. The motion was filed on the first business day
following the tenth calendar day after the Court's ruling of Wednesday, April 21, 2010.
Even if the Court's date stamp of May 5, rather than the service date of May 3, is used,
the filing was timely given the exclusion, under Rule 6, Utah R. Civ. P., of intervening
Saturdays, Sundays and holidays. Accordingly, the Court improperly declined to
consider Plaintiffs motion for a new trial on timeliness grounds. By the same token,
Plaintiffs appeal from the Court's denial of January 3, 2011 was timely.
Unrefuted evidence at trial clearly made out the elements of Plaintiff s claim for
easement by necessity. The evidence established common ownership of the Trust
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Property and the properties lying to the east thereof under unity of title, followed by
severance of that unity; also, the existence of reasonable necessity of an easement in
order to obtain access between the Trust Property and the outside world. The trial court's
ruling improperly imposed the additional requirement that the necessity exist at the
instant of severance - a fact to which no living witness was in a position to give
testimony. The law does not require such a time snapshot, however.
The trial court also improperly relied upon implications arising from language in
the deed to the RKR North Property, holding (without evidentiary support) that the
language evinced an "intent55 to create an express easement between the Trust Property
and the county road over adjacent land. The reservation of easement contained in the
RKR North Deed, however, did not constitute an express conveyance of easement to
Plaintiff or its predecessors in interest, but only the reservation of such rights to the
grantors. .No companion conveyance, sufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds, gave rise
to the conveyance of any express easement in favor of the Trust Property over the RKR
North Property.
Finally, the Court should have recognized, from the face of conveyances before it,
that a reservation of easement had been placed on the RKR North Deed by mistake. On
that document, the reservation of easement served no purpose, that the RKR North
Property already flanked the adjacent county road. Accordingly, reformation of
subsequent deeds to preserve the intended easement on the properties meant to be crossed
thereby was in order.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
UNTIMELY.

In its Order of January 3, 2011^ denying Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial (R. 739741), the trial court refused to reach the merits of Plaintiff s Motion at all, holding instead
that:
In this case the motion for new trial was filed more than ten days after the
entry of judgment. Under Utah Supreme Court's holding in Burgers [v.
Maiben, 652 P.2d 1320, 1321 (Utah 1982)], this Court's only alternative is
to deny the motion.
Order of January 3, 2011, at p. 2 (R. 740; Appendix at Attachment 3). The Court's ruling
in this regard is unsustainable, and unexplainable.
As noted in the statement of the case, above, this Court entered judgment in this
matter on Wednesday, April 21, 2010 (R. 647-650). Ten calendar days following that
ruling was Saturday, May 1, 2010. Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial, while date-stamped
at the Sixth District Court in Kanab, Utah, on May 5, 2010, was in fact mailed to the
Court and opposing counsel on Monday, May 3, 2010 (R. 651-653).
Under Rule 59(b), Utah R. Civ. P., "a motion for a new trial shall be served not
later than ten days after the entry of judgment." Given that the judgment in this matter
was entered on Wednesday, April 21, 2010, the tenth calendar date following entry was
Saturday, May 1, 2010. Pursuant to Rule 6(a), Utah R. Civ. P., the last day of any filing
period provided by the rules is to be counted in the computation of the period "unless it is
a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday, in which event the period runs until the end of
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the next day that is not a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday." Even if strict calendar
days are used, therefore, Plaintiff had until the following Monday, May 3, 2010, in which
to file his motion. It was on this day that the motion was sent and served on the Court
and opposing counsel - see R. 651-653. As noted in the case of Burgers v. Maiben, 652
P.2d 1320 (Utah 1982):
Under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 59(b), a party must serve a motion for
a new trial on the opposing party within ten days from the entry of
judgment.
(Emphasis added.) As service upon the opposing party is effective upon mailing {see
Rule 5(b)(1)(B), Utah R. Civ. P.), service of Plaintiff s Motion for New Trial in this
matter was complete on May 3, 2010 - the first business day following the tenth calendar
day after entry of judgment.
Even if the Court's date-stamped filing date of May 5, 2010 is used, however, the
filing was timely. This is because, under Rule 6(a), Utah R. Civ. P.,
When the period of time prescribed or allowed, without reference to any
additional time under subsection (e), is less than 11 days, intermediate
Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays shall be excluded in the
computation.
If weekends and holidays between April 21, 2010 and May 5, 2010 are excluded from the
computation, May 5th was the tenth day following entry of judgment. The Utah Supreme
Court has expressly applied the language from Rule 6(a), quoted above, to appeal
deadlines. In the case of Low v. City ofMonticello} 2002 UT 90, 54 P.3d 1153, the City
of Monticello challenged the timeliness of a petition for extraordinary writ filed under
Utah Code Ann. § 20A-7-607(4)(a) (which provision also requires the filing of the
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petition within ten days of a city clerk's refusal to accept a referendum petition). The
court held that weekends and legal holidays were to be excluded from the ten-day appeal
period, thus making the petitioner's filing timely - 2002 UT 90 at ^J18.
Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial in this matter was served on opposing counsel by
mailing on May 3, 2010; it was filed with the Court on May 5, 2010. If intervening
weekends are excluded from the ten-day period under Rule 59, either filing date is within
the ten days mandated thereby. Accordingly, the trial court erroneously and improperly
found Plaintiffs filing untimely. For the same reason, Plaintiffs Notice of Appeal to this
Court was timely under Rule 4(b)(1)(D), Utah R. App. P., having come within 30 days of
the trial court's disposition of Plaintiff s Motion for New Trial.
POINT II:

THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED (YET THE COURT
FAILED TO FIND) THE NON-EXISTENCE OF A
LEGAL RIGHT OF ACCESS BETWEEN THE TRUST
PROPERTY AND THE ADJACENT COUNTY ROAD
AT THE TIME OF SEVERANCE, OR THEREAFTER.

The doctrine of easement by necessity was addressed by the Utah Supreme Court
in the case of Tschaggeny v. Union Pacific Land Resources Corporation, 555 P.2d 277
(Utah 1976). Therein, the Court stated that "...a way of necessity arises when there is a
conveyance of a part of a tract of land which is so situated that either the part conveyed or
the part retained is surrounded with no access to a road to the outer world" (555 P. 2d at
280). The Tschaggeny decision was cited and upheld by the Utah Court of Appeals in the
case of Potter v. Chadaz, 1999 UT App. 95 at If 18, 977 P.2d 533, 538.
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Tschaggeny made clear that an easement by necessity was established by the
existence of two factors: "(1) Unity of title, followed by severance; [and (2)] That the
easement is reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of the dominant estate..." (555 P. 2d at
280). Two additional requirements exist for the creation of an easement by implication
(that the servitude be "apparent, obvious and visible" at the time of severance, and that it
be "continuous and self-acting"); these, however, were expressly held unnecessary to the
creation of a way of necessity.
Evidence at trial in this matter established the two requisite elements beyond
doubt. The Trust Property was, prior to August of 1964, held in unity of title with the
Park Property. Absent an easement of necessity, the owner of the Trust Property has no
reasonable legal access therefrom to the outer world. The trial court needed to conduct
no further inquiry than this. Yet the trial court, while apparently recognizing (at least
implicitly) the truth of both these facts, imposed additional requirements, and imputed
relevance to irrelevant facts, to leave the Trust Property completely landlocked and
useless.
A.

Undisputed Evidence Established the Lack of a Legal Means of Access to the
Trust Property, Rendering the Presence or Absence of Physical Access
Irrelevant
The undisputed evidence presented prior to and during trial was that all relevant

properties in this action were held in unity of title by Bertrand and Idona Smith until
August 1, 1964. On that date, by simultaneous conveyances, title from the North
Property was conveyed to RKR Construction Company, while the Trust Property
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(together with the Carr Property and the Watson Property) were conveyed to Gary Smith,
Gary Watson and Oliver LeFevre, Smiths retaining title to the Park Property.
Contrary to its Findings and Conclusions, the Court was presented not only with
competent, but uncontroverted, evidence that, from that time forward, there was no legal
right of access between the Trust Property, the Watson Property or the Carr Property and
the adjacent county road. Not until 1970 did any such legal right of access pass from
Idona Smith (as the surviving common grantor) to Bud Allen (then owner of the Carr
Property) - but that right of access was limited to Mr. Allen and his family members. All
routes identified in testimony presented by the Park Defendants, whether or not
physically passable, were not legally permissible, according to the undisputed testimony
of Mark Hulet, who had searched the record and established that no legal right of access
existed of record between the Trust Property and the adjacent county road after August 1,
1964. Without exception, the alternate routes between the Trust Property and the
adjacent county road, listed at f 18 of the Court's Findings, were trespassory to the rights
of the respective landowners, and illegal.
It is established law that u[a]n easement by necessity is not defeated by the
grantee's ability to access a public road over a stranger's property" - see The Fitzgerald
Living Trust v. United States, 460 F. 3d 1259, 1266 (9th Cir. 2006). Indeed, in other
jurisdictions, the doctrine of easement by necessity has been articulated as arising "by
operation of law when part of a commonly-owned tract of land is severed in a way that
renders either portion of the property inaccessible except by passing over the other
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portion or by trespassing on the lands of another" - Fike v. Shelton, 860 So. 2d
1227,1230 (Ct. App. Miss. 2003). Even where an alternate access route is used by
permission, it does not constitute a legal right of access and cannot defeat a way of
necessity - Spier v. Brewer, 958 S.W. 2d 83 (Ct. App. Mo. 1997).
From August 1, 1964, then, owners of the Trust Property were barred on all sides
from accessing their property from the county road without committing trespass. This
fact appears from the trial record, and nothing offered by Defendants refutes it.
B.

Governing Case Law Does Not Mandate Proof That the Necessity Existed at
the Moment of Severance of Title, Even Though Plaintiff's Proof Established
This Fact
In its Findings and Conclusions, the Court focused on the absence of testimony, by

any witness at trial, concerning whether there was physical access to and from the Trust
Property at the moment of severance of title in August of 1964, the Court noting
(correctly) that Plaintiff had been unable to locate or produce a still-living witness who
could speak to this issue. Any reliance placed by the Court on this lack of evidence,
however, ignores two salient points.
First, there is no requirement in governing case law that a party seeking the
establishment of an easement by necessity produce eye witnesses who can recreate a
"snap shot55 of the physical accessibility of the severed property at the instant that title is
severed. Defendants produced no case law imposing such a requirement - and indeed,
did not even address it in their trial memorandum, counsel merely arguing the point
during the course of trial.
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In fact, the law requires only the establishment of unity of title followed by
severance, and a reasonable necessity of access between the landlocked property and the
outer world. The Tschaggeny decision makes clear that, in the case of easement by
necessity (unlike that of easement by implication) the easement need not be shown to
exist at the time of severance. This is necessarily so, given the nature of the remedy
being sought. The law has moved beyond the point of requiring indulgence of the fiction
that the easement existed (or was created) at any given point in time, and implies the
easement to remedy the reasonable necessity of the landowner, in order to promote the
beneficial use of the land. This overriding policy was made clear in the related context of
the applicability of statutes of limitation to claims of easement by necessity (argued by
Defendants in this case, but apparently disregarded by the Court in its ruling). In the case
of Lichty v. Sickels, 149 Cal. App. 3d 696, 197 Cal. Rptr. 137 (Ct. App. 4th Dis., Div 1,
CA 1983), the court refused a statute of limitations claim may be asserted by any remote
transferee of the dominant property, at any point in time, holding that the policy behind
statutes of limitation (the avoidance of stale claims) "does not outweigh the policy of
freeing up land for beneficial use." By analogy, insistence that the claimant seeking a
way of necessity to and from a landlocked parcel of property should not be put to the task
of locating and producing still-living witnesses who can speak to the physical means of
access to and from a long-severed parcel of landlocked property, provided the proof
establishes the present existence of a reasonable necessity in order to access the property
in the future.
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Second, the Court's observations overlook the fact that Plaintiff did establish,
without challenge, that no legal access point existed at any time after unity of title to the
Smith Properties was severed on August 1, 1964. The absence of proof concerning
physical means of access does not override this fact, as any such physical access means
would have been trespassory in nature.

In short, Plaintiffs proof established the elements of easement by necessity:
(1) unity of title followed by severance, and (2) no reasonable means of access between
the landlocked parcel and an adjacent public road. Based on this alone, the Court should
have granted an easement by necessity to permit access to the Trust Property from the
adjacent county road.
POINT III:

THE SUBJECTION OF THE NORTH PROPERTY TO
AN EASEMENT FROM THE COUNTY ROAD TO ITS
WESTERN BOUNDARY DOES NOT EVINCE AN
INTENT BY THE GRANTORS TO RESERVE AN
EXPRESS EASEMENT IN FAVOR OF THE TRUST
PROPERTY.

The Trial Court's second Conclusion of Law concerning Plaintiffs claim of
easement by necessity invokes language from the Tschaggeny decision to the effect that
the creation of an easement by necessity may be defeated by evidence of a contrary intent
in the common grantor. In its Findings of Fact, the Court noted that, on the same day that
it conveyed the property which would become the Watson Property, the Trust Property
and the Carr Property (by Deed 396, Plaintiffs Exhibit 4, referred to by the Court's
ruling as "Deed A"), Smiths also conveyed the North Property (by Deed 00030,
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Plaintiffs Exhibit 27, which the Court referred to as "Deed B"), and which contained the
following language:
The above property is subject to a 30-foot right-of-way from the Kane
County Road to the NW corner of the N lA of the SW %, Section 19,
Township 38S, Range 8W.
The Court concluded, at paragraph 4(B) of its Conclusions of Law, that the presence of
this language in the deed to the North Property somehow evidenced an intent by Smiths
to convey an easement over the RKR North Property to Plaintiffs predecessor in interest,
which defeats Plaintiffs claim of easement by necessity across the Park Property. With
respect, it is submitted that the Court has confused both the property as benefitted and
burdened by the language on Deed 396, and the distinction between easements by
necessity and express easements.
A.

The Trial Court Misstated the Property Burdened by the Reservation of
Easement
First, the Court found that the reservation easement on Deed 00396 (Deed "B")

evinced an intent by Smiths to grant access to and from the County Road to all portions
of the property granted by Deed "B" - yet the property from which Plaintiff derives its
title to the Trust Property was included in the property conveyed by Deed 00030 (Deed
"A" in the Courf s analysis). The Court's observation that Deed "B"' evidences clear
intent on the part of the parties to the severance that the express easement granted in
Deed "B" was the intended means of access to the 80-acre parcel conveyed in Deed "B"
confers no benefit - express, implied, constructive or otherwise - on the Trust Property,
which was not conveyed by Deed "B."
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B.

The Reservation of Easement Rights on Deed B Conveyed No Express
Easement Rights to the Transferees Under Deed A, Nor Did It Express An
Intent to Do So.
Even if it was the Court's intent to hold that the easement language contained in

Deed "B" was intended by Smiths to grant access to the owners and transferees of
property conveyed by Deed "A," such finding would of necessity entail the conclusion
that the reservation language on Deed "B" constituted an express grant of easement for
the benefit of the property conveyed by Deed "A." In other words, the Court attempted,
in its Findings and Conclusions, to invoke the "intent55 exception mentioned in the
Tschaggeny decision, not by finding that Smiths intended to land lock the Trust Property
at the time title to the Smith Properties was severed, but by implying that they intended to
create an express easement over other property, for the benefit of the Trust Property (as
well as the Watson and Carr Properties), by inclusion, in Deed "B,55 of the easement
reservation language. To find such an intent from the face of the instrument alone,
however, the Court needs to establish that the easement language used by Smiths on
Deed "B" was in fact legally sufficient to convey an express easement for the benefit of
the property conveyed by Deed "A55 - which, under governing law, it simply was not.
Utah law clearly mandates that an express easement - like any other interest in
real property - must be conveyed by a deed sufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds. See
Evans v. Board of County Commissioners of Utah County, 2004 UT App. 256, 97 P.3d
697; Hart v. Schimmelpfennig, 2009 UT App. 27, 2009 WL 271230; Potter v. Chadaz,
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1999 UT App. 95, 977 P.2d 533. Utah's Statute of Frauds, relating to the conveyance of
interests in real property, is set out at Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1:
No estate or interest in real property . . . shall be created, granted, assigned,
surrendered or declared otherwise than by an act or operation of lawr, or by
deed or conveyance in writing subscribed by the party creating the same,
granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the same, or by his lawful
agent thereunto authorized by writing."
(Emphasis added.)
Neither the RKR North Deed (Deed "B" in the Court's ruling) nor the RKR Deed
(Deed "A" in the Court's ruling) granted or conveyed to any transferee any easement
rights in either property. The language contained in the RKR North Deed (Deed "B")
reserved easement rights by making the conveyance subject thereto; the easement rights
so reserved, however, were not conveyed to the transferees of the RKR Deed (Deed "A").
The effect of subjecting property otherwise conveyed to easement rights is to reserve
such rights in the grantor - not to transfer them to a third party without any separate
grant. See Martinez v. Wells, 2004 UT App. 43, 88 P.3d 343. Indeed, a reservation of
easement in a conveyance between two parties is insufficient, as a matter of law, to create
property rights in a "stranger to the transaction" - see Potter v. Chadaz, 1999 UT App.
95, 977 P.2d 533("Utah law prohibits parties from expressly creating an easement in a
land transaction for the benefit of a third party who is not involved in the transaction-i.e.,
a 'stranger to the deed'... The law of real property in Utah.. .is that a grantor may
'reserve' an interest to itself, but not to a third party." - 1999 UT App. 95 at «|| 12.) As no
express conveyance of an easement interest across the North Property appears of record
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between Smiths and Plaintiffs predecessors- in-title to the Trust Property, the statute of
frauds is not satisfied, and no express easement interest arises. If the trial court could
have inferred anything from the easement language on Deed "B", therefore, it could infer
only that Smiths reserved such easement rights to themselves - not that they conveyed, or
intended to convey, the same to the transferees under Deed "A".
Indeed, it was this lack of manifest intent to convey a separate easement right
under the RKR Deed (Deed "A") which prompted Plaintiff to attempt to persuade the
trial court to reform the two 1964 conveyances, and subsequent conveyances, such that
the easement rights would appear on the proper document, so that the reservation of
easement would make some sense. The trial court declined, however, to reform the
deeds, claiming that Plaintiff had offered no evidence of the grantors' intent (see
Conclusion of Law No. 6). It is ironic, frankly, that the lower court declined to reform
the deeds to give effect to the reservation of easement language appearing on the RKR
North Deed (Deed "B"), citing a lack of evidence of the grantors' intent with respect
thereto, yet invoked an implication of intent as a means of defeating Plaintiffs claim of
easement by necessity.
Absent any expression of intent on Smiths' part to convey an express easement to
the grantees of the RKR Deed (Exh. 4) to match the reservation of easement rights on the
RKR North Deed (Exh. 27), the trial court could not properly rely on reservation
language in an adjacent deed to reflect "intent" to withhold an easement by necessity over
the Park Property Easement. Such an assumption suggests somehow that, even though
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR,
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no conveyance of an easement right was given, Smiths "intended" that the grantees of the
RKR have an easement in that location, such that a claim of easement by necessity in
another location was defeated thereby. This, though, would be the equivalent of a finding
that Smiths "intended" that Plaintiff have an easement by necessity over the RKR North
Property - an assumption nowhere reflected in the evidence, and at odds with the
fundamental law of easements by necessity, which by definition are not created by intent
or agreement - see Dansie v. Hi Country Estates Homeowners Ass'n, 2004 UT App. 149,
92 P.3d 162. Given that Plaintiff could not satisfy the statute of frauds and argue creation
of an express easement, could not persuade the Court to reform the instruments of
conveyance to establish such an express easement, and could not satisfy the Court
concerning the propriety of an easement by necessity, its claim seems to have fallen
through non-existent cracks between the three theories.

POINT IV: THE DEEDS FROM IDONA SMITH TO HARRISES,
AND FROM HARRISES TO THE PARK
DEFENDANTS, SHOULD BE REFORMED TO
REFLECT THE INTENDED EXISTENCE OF AN
ACCESS EASEMENT BETWEEN THE TRUST
PROPERTY AND THE ADJACENT COUNTY ROAD.
Reformation is a remedy available to a court sitting equity, to correct mistakes in
deeds and other instruments of conveyance where a preponderance of the evidence
establishes that the instruments do not reflect the grantor's intent. See generally West
One Trust Company v. Morrison, 861 P.2d 1058, 1061 (Utah App. 1993); Haslem v.
Ottosen, 689 P.2d 27, 30 (Utah 1984); Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Section 155
(1979). A deed is subject to reformation in the case of mutual mistake by the parties to
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the transaction, or by ignorance or mistake by one party and corresponding fraud by the
other party. Panos v. Olsen & Associates Construction, Inc., 2005 UT App. 446 at *f 21,
123 P.3d 816, 821-822.
The course of transfers and conveyances appearing of public record in connection
with the Trust Property, the Carr Property and the Park Property clearly evince an intent,
on the part of the Smiths and their transferees in 1964 to preserve an easement between
the county road and the properties conveyed by the 1965 RKR Deed. Contrary to the
findings of the trial court, moreover, the intent is manifest from the face of the public
record.
First, if the Court compares the deed by which Bertrand C. and Idona J. Smith
conveyed the three properties (Watson, Trust and Carr) to RKR Construction on
August 1, 1964 ("RKR Deed5', Exh. 4) with the deed executed by the Smiths to RKR
Construction Company on the same day, conveying property immediately to the north of
the Trust Property ("RKR North Deed55, Exh. 27), the Court will note that the RKR North
Deed includes, in addition to the property deeded thereby, the following limitation:
The above property is subject to a 30-foot right-of-way from the Kane
County Road to the northwest corner of the north one-half of the southwest
one-quarter, section 19, township 38S, range 8W.
An examination of this line indicates that the described 30-foot right-of-way runs from
the Kane County Road (K2000) along the center section line of section 19 to the western
edge of that section, where the northwest corner of the property described in the RKR
Deed meets the southwest comer of the property described in the RKR North Deed - see
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Exh. 3. While, as drafted, the RKR North Deed is made subject to the described right-ofway, nothing in the RKR Deed (or in any subsequent conveyance of the property
described therein) gives that property benefit of the right-of-way. A review of the two
deeds side-by-side, in fact, shows that an error was clearly made in the placement of the
right-of-way description on the RKR North Deed, and that Smiths intended to place the
right-of-way along the northern border of the property described in the RKR Deed, for
the benefit of the Watson Property, the Trust Property and the Carr Property. The
following monikers establish this fact:
a.

Both deeds were prepared and signed on the same day, before the

b.

The right-of-way is described from calls within the southwest

same notary;

quarter of Section 19 where the property deed by the RKR Deed is located, rather than
from the northwest quarter of the section, where the property deeded by the RKR North
Deed is located;
c.

Access over the southernmost 30 feet of the property described in

the RKR North deed is impassible;
d.

Most telling, the property described in the RKR Deed is not adjacent

to County Road K-2000, is landlocked, and has need of a right-of-way to access the
public road; the property described by the RKR North Deed, by contrast, is adjacent to
the county road, and requires no access thereto.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

36

m i n i

i

Second, when the three transferees of the property conveyed by the RKR Deed
split their respective properties into the Watson Property, the Trust Property and the CanProperty (Exhs. 6-8), they conveyed reciprocal rights over and across their respective
parcels of property to the benefit of neighboring landowners, to permit access to the
county road via the easement crossing the northernmost 30 feet of their respective
properties. This would hardly have accomplished anything had it been the intent of the
grantees not to have access from their respective properties to the adjacent county road.
While (as noted by the trial court in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law see Appendix at Attachment 1, p. 10) the parties to the transactions listed above are now
deceased and cannot testify, the evidence from the documents of record renders the
conclusion inescapable that, in conveying the RKR Property, Bertrand and Idona Smith
intended to reserve a right-of-way from that property to the adjacent county road. Its
subsequent omission from the deeds to Paul and Gina Harris, and from Paul and Gina
Harris to the Park Defendants, should be rectified by an order of reformation subjecting
both transfers to an access easement in favor of the Trust Property.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff Abraham & Associates Trust, through a series of valid and uncontested
conveyances, took good and marketable title to a property which is completely land
locked. Its owners cannot get in. They cannot get out. Any access to the property entails
trespass; ingress or egress over any route other than the existing road across the Park
Property Easement entails traversing the rugged, native mountain terrain and/or springDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

37

soaked marshland. Equity and good conscience dictate that, in order to make profitable
and beneficial use of its property, Plaintiff be granted a right of access to the outside
world. This is the essence, purpose and underlying policy of the doctrine of easement by
necessity. As an alternative, the Court can recognize that the common grantors, Bertrand
and Idona Smith, intended in 1964 to remedy the lack of access to the property conveyed
by the RKR Deed, but placed the easement reservation on the wrong document.
The trial court should have selected one doctrine or the other to permit some
legal - and physically reasonable - means of access to the Trust Property from the
adjacent county road. Instead, the trial court implicated the property rights of an entity
not even before it.
For the foregoing reasons, it is submitted that the holding of the trial court should
be reversed, and that this Court find either the existence of an easement by necessity, or
an express easement through reformation, across the Park Property Easement.
DATED this 19th day of April, 2011.

A

JONES WALDO IK5LBROOK & McDONOUGH PC

^ ^

Vincei^C. Hampton
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was
mailed via first class mail, postage prepaid, to the following this 19th day of April, 2011:
Michael W. Park
The Park Firm PC
315 West Hilton Drive, #4
St. George, UT 84770
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FILED
KANE COUNTY

__MAR_ft_S_2mOClerk
SIXTH DISTRICT COURT
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
KANE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE ABRAHAM & ASSOCIATES TRUST,
MICHAEL ROBERT BARKER, Trustee,
FINDINGS OF FACT
AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,

vs.
JAMES M. PARK AND TORI L. PARK, and
DENNIS CARR AND DONETTE CARR,

Civil No. 060600022
Judge Marvin D Bagley

Defendants.

Trial to the court was held in this action on January 26,2010. Plaintiff The Abraham &
Associates Trust, Michael Robert Barker, trustee (hereinafter "the Trust") was represented by
Vincent C. Rampton, Esq. of the law firm of Jones, y aldo, Holbrook & McDonough PC.
Although trustee Michael Robert Barker was not: present;at trial the parties stipulated that
Sylvester Mark Hulet had authority to act on behalf cjf the Trust. Defendants James M. Park and
Tori L. Park (hereinafter "the Parks") were represented by Michael W. Park, Esq. of The Park
Firm P.C. Defendants Dennis Carr and Donette Cad (hereinafter "the Carrs") previously
stipulated with the Trust for entry of a decree resolvingg all issues between the Trust and the
Carrs. An Order of Quiet Title and Dismissal based <bn the stipulation was entered by Judge
David L. Mower on October 6, 2006 dismissing the Carrs from this action.
The court having heard the evidence presentejd and the arguments of counsel and being

1
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fully advised NOW ENTERS the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. This is an action brought by the Trust seeking a decree declaring that it is the owner of
a right of way easement for ingress and egress across real property owned by the Parks located on
Cedar Mountain in Kane County, Utah. At trial the Trust asserted four legal theories to support
its claims: (1) easement by necessity, (2) easement by implication, (3) easement by prescription,
and (4) reformation of a deed to establish an express pasement.
2. Prior to August 1, 1964 Bertrand C. Smith! and Idona J. Smith (hereinafter "the
Smiths") owned a large parcel of real property (approximately 274 acres) located on Cedar
Mountain in Kane County Utah in Section 19, Township 38 South, Range 8 West.
3. Although no conveyance document was introduced into evidence to establish this fact
the parties acknowledged, when questioned by the cojurt, that prior to August 1,1964 the Smiths
owned their property as a single parcel.
4. The Smiths accessed their parcel of propeijty via a county road that bordered and
passed through portions of their property.
5. On August 1, 1964 the Smiths conveyed t i e majority of that real property to R-K-R
Construction Company (hereinafter "RKR") by executing and delivering two warranty deeds.
One of the two deeds, which was recorded as Entry Mo. 00396 (hereinafter referred to herein as
Deed "A"), conveyed approximately 80 acres using the following legal description:

2

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

N Vi of the SW 1/4 Section 19, Township 38 $outh, Range 8 West, Salt Lake Base
and Meridian, Kane County, Utah together wikh 0625 Second Feet of water from
Award No. 34 Virgin River Decree, entered August 21,1926, in the name of
James Smith and from ditch No 1.
The other deed recorded with Entry No. 00030 (which will hereinafter be referred to herein as
Deed "B") conveyed approximately 240 acres to RKR using the following legal description:
ip 38 South, Range 8 West, Salt
NW 1/4, W V2 of the NE 1/4 Section 19, Towiiship
Lake Base and Meridian Kane County, Utah to gether with .1875 Second Feet of
water from Award No. 34, Virgin River Decree,, entered August 21, 1926, in the
name of James Smith from ditch No.l.
The above property is subject to a '30 foot rigjht of way from the Kane County
Road to the NW corner of the Nl/2 of the S W 4 ,, Section 19, Township 38 S,
Range 8 W.
6. The Smiths retained, and did not convey to RKR approximately 34 acres of their
original parcel. The east boundary of the parcel retained by the Smiths borders the County Road.
The west boundary of the parcel retained by the Smiths borders the east boundary of the
approximate 80 acre parcel of property conveyed by tjhe Smiths to RKR in Deed "A". The
northern boundary of the parcel retained by the Smith s borders a portion of the South boundary
of the approximate 240 acre parcel conveyed to RKR] in Deed "B". The parcel retained by the
Smith's is currently owned by defendants the Parks and is the property which the Trust seeks to
have declared an easement across the northern boundary.. The property retained by the Smiths
will hereafter be referred to as "the Park Property" add is described as follows
Beginning S 89°51?01M W, 1641.15 ft. along the 1/4 section line for the East 1/4
corner Section 19, T38S, R8W, SLM; said point of beginning being P.O.C. on the
3
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

West boundary of North Fork Estates, Unit #2, radius point of P.O.C. bears S
65o35'10" E, 430.00 ft.; thence counterclockwise along arc of said curve 122.31 ft.
to the P.C.C. of a 699.55 ft. radius curve, radilis point bears S 81°53T00" E; thence
counterclockwise along arc of said curve 110.49 ft.; thence S 0°56,00M E, 345.82
ft., to the P.C. of a 780.00 ft. radius curve; thence counterclockwise along arc of
said curve, 237.33 ft.; thence S 18°22W E, 17.20 ft. to the P.C. of a 970.00 ft.
radius curve; thence clockwise along arc of said curve, 362.58 ft.; thence S
3°03 W W, 14.20 ft. to the P.C. of a 297.79 ft. radius curve; thence
counterclockwise along arc of said curve, 163L54 ft. to the P.R.C. of a 740 ft.
radius curve, radius point bears S 61°35'W; thence clockwise along arc of said
curve, 64.43 ft.; thence departing said roadway and subdivision boundary S
89°51'0r W, 1148.37 ft.; thence N l°37f54M W, 1410.06 ft. along the 1/4 section
line to the center of said section 19; thence N p o 51'01" E, 1067.99 ft. along the
11A section line to the point of beginning. Containing 34.113 acres of land.
7. On the very same day as the conveyances mom the Smiths to RKR (August 1, 1964)
RKR as Grantor conveyed the same 80 acre parcel (described in Deed "A") to Grantees B. Gary
Smith, Gary K. Watson and Oliver D LeFevre in a Warranty Deed recorded as Entry No. 00346.
8. On or about December 21,1965 Grantees B. Gary Smith, Gary K. Watson and Oliver
D LeFevre partitioned, by executing deeds among themselves, the approximate 80 acre parcel
they obtained form RKR. The 80 acre parcel was divided into three approximate equal parcels.
9. Of the three approximate equal parcels that were divided on or about December 21,
1965, B. Gary Smith was conveyed the parcel farthest east. That parcel is currently owned by
defendants the Carrs (and will be referred to hereinafter as "the Carr Property")- The Carr
Property borders on its east boundary the parcel originally retained by the Smiths which is the
Park Property. The legal description of the Carr Property is:
Beginning at the Center of Section 19, townsnip 38 South, Range 8 West, Salt
4
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Lake Meridian, and running thence South 1320 feet; thence South 89°43f West
897.2 feet; thence North 1320 feet; thence North 89°43T East 897.2 feet, to the
place of beginning, containing 27.19 acres mqre or less.
10. Of the three approximate equal parcels thjat were divided on or about December 21,
1965, Oliver D. LeFevre was conveyed the parcel in tjhe middle. That parcel is currently owned
by plaintiff the Trust and is the parcel the Trust seeks! to have benefitted by this action. That
parcel will hereafter be referred to as "the Trust Property and is described as follows:
Beginning at a point South 89°43T West 897.2; feet from the center of Section 19,
Township 38 South, Range 8 West, Salt Lake; Base and Meridian, and running
thence South 1320 feet, thence South 89°43? ^ e s t 897.2 feet; thence North 1320
feet; thence North 89°43f East 897.2 feet to thfe place of beginning.
11. Of the three approximate equal parcels that were divided on or about December 21.
1965, Gary K Watson was conveyed the parcel on th^ west. That parcel will hereafter be referred
to as "the Watson Property".
12. The northwest corner of the Watson prop!jsrty is the northwest corner of the north Vi
of the southwest 1/4 of Section 19, Township 38 South, Range 8 West. That corner is the
terminus of the express easement described in Deed' B" identified above,
13. Following partition among themselves oft the 80 acre parcel in approximately
December 21,1965, B. Gary Smith, Oliver D. LeFevfe and Gary K. Watson deeded to each other
and among themselves a thirty (30) foot right of way easement for ingress and egress along the
northern boundaries of their three respective properties
14. The Carr Property was subsequently COOT eyed to Bud R. Allen. On or about
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November 7, 1970 the Smiths and/or their successors in interest executed an Easement and Right
of Way granting to Bud R. Allen, "his wife, family, heirs, legatees and devisees" a " perpetual
easement and right of way" over the northern thirty (30) feet of the Park Property. The easement
recited that it was "[s]ubject to the condition that said Bud R. Allen, his wife, family, heirs,
legatees and devisees shall use said easement and right of way only for their personal and private
use and that said grantees also prevent any other person or persons from using said easement and
right of way unless expressly agreed to by the Grantojrs". The easement benefitted the Aliens
and/or the Carr Property.
15. The Parks acquired the Park Property in: 001 from Paul R. Harris and Gina L.
Harris.
16. The principals of the Trust acquired the Tjrust Property from the Estate of Oliver D.
LeFevre in August 1994.
17. The only direct evidence presented at trial:relating to the creation or existence of
easements or access roads to, from or through any of (the parcels of property relevant to this
action that were created or in existence on August 1, 11964 is Deed "B'\ Deed "B" declares the
approximate 240 acre conveyance from the Smiths to| RKR is subject to an express easement
"from the Kane County Road to the NW corner of th^Nl/2 of the SW1/4, Section 19, Township
38 S, Range 8 W."
18. The following evidence was presented at trial relating to the existence or creation of

6

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

roads or right of ways at various other times subsequent to August 1,1964 which are relevant to
any of the parcels involved in this action:
a. Donald E. Stucker, who has ownedj real property in the vicinity of the
Park Property and the Trust Property since 1975, testified that in 1978 there
existed a road across the northern boundary o the Park Property that led into the
Carr Property. He testified it was a two whee drive road and that the gate to the
road was not locked on occasions when he; wasthere. He said the road that exists
on the same location today is in much better condition than it was in 1978. He
testified the road only went into the Carr Propjerty and did not extend into the
Trust Property.
b. Mr. Stucker also testified he is awa|re of and has driven a road that
accesses the Trust Property from a road throu« ;h North Fork Estates which is
directly south of the Trust Property. He testified the road was made by "LeFevre"
and proceeded north along the boundary of lo s 5 and 6 of North Fork Estates. He
said the road once was accessible by car but npw is only accessible by ATV.
c. John E. Eckert, a permanent resident of Cedar Mountain testified he has
personal knowledge of roads in the area since|1975 He testified that from 1975 to
1979 nobody locked any gates and the roads lfr the area were open to everyone,
He testified that between 1975 and 1980 therd were three roads that passed
through the RICR property at various location^ north of the Trust Propeity that led
to the Trust Property. He testified one of the oads passed through the east side of
the RKR property and traveled in a northwest) tfly direction to the northern part of
the RKR property and then looped back southwesterly 1to the Trust propeity. The
access roads were accessible from the County] Road. He testified he could drive
his car from his cabin to the Trust Property, He testified access to the road he
specifically described which led to the Trust property was later blocked.
d. Mr. Eckert also testified that in 19 5 there existed a road along the
north boundary of the Park Property leading;tb the Carr Property. He said the
road passed through a marsh that was passabl£ at times and not passable at other
times. He testified that a dike across the mar^'h was authorized to be constructed
in 1977 to 1979 and that construction of the dike was finished by Bud Allen in
1980. (Bud Allen was a prior owner of the Ckr Property and is a grantee of the
easement granted by the Smiths and their successors:in interest in 1970.)
e. Jim Park testified that when he purlphased the Park Property in 2001 the
"dike" which is the road across the north boundary of the Park Property existed
but was impassable. He testified he had to cut many trees over the summers of
7
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2001 and 2002 to make the road passable.
f. Jim Park also testified and showed pictures of a road that cuts off the
County Road approximately 150 yards north qf the Park Property and travels
westerly through a portion of the RKR property, There is another cut off from
that road that leads in a Southerly direction to jthe northeast corner of the CanProperty. He testified the two roads are passable by trucks and that the distance
from the County Road to the northeast comer |of the Carr Property is two tenths of
a mile.
g. Sylvester Mark Hulet testified he purchased the Trust Property in 1994
and has been affiliated with ownership of the JTrust Property through trusts or
otherwise since that time. He introduced pictures of the road across the northern
boundary of the Park Property that leads to th^ Carr Property. He testified the
road goes only into the Carr Property and that Itrees would have to be cut and road
work performed to extend the road from the uarr'Property to the Trust Property,
h. Mr. Hulet also testified that he alitteijnpted to access the Trust Property
via a road that turns off the County Road just jiorth of the Park Property and
passes through the RKR Property. He testified he could not drive his vehicle all
the way to the Trust Property because there were fallen trees and two washes that
he could not traverse in his vehicle. He also testified to the existence of
"underground springs" that created a marsh th|at could not be driven across during
certain times of the year.
i. Mr. Hulet also testified that he attenjipted to access the Trust Property
from the South through the switchback road that-passes through North Fork
only be accessed by ATV.
Estates. He said the road had deep ruts and could <
19. The court accepts the testimony as stated in Paragraph 18(a)-(i) above as fact,
20. To the extent any of the above Findings op Fact are in actuality conclusions of law
they are so denominated.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. There was no evidence presented at trial as| to the existence or long term use (twenty
years) of an access across the Park Property leading td> the Trust Property. The elements of a
claim for easement by prescription were thus not pro^ en. See Jensen v. Brown, 639 P.2d 150,
8
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152 (Utah 1981). The Trust also conceded at trial it did not have the necessary evidence to
prevail on its claim for prescriptive easement. Accomingly judgment should be entered in favor
of defendants the Parks on plaintiff the Trust's claimj for easement by prescription.
2. The evidence presented at trial established) the roadway ("the dike") across the north of
the Park Property has been used in the past to enter tike Carr Property. There was no evidence
presented to establish that the roadway continued through the Carr Property and into the Trust
Property. Indeed the evidence was to the contrary. Sylvester Mark Hulet testified trees would
have to be cut and road work performed across the C]jarr Property to extend the roadway into the
Trust Property. There was no evidence presented as| to the existence of a roadway leading to the
Trust Property on August 1, 1964.
An easement by implication requires the easehient to be apparent, obvious and visible at
the time of severance. See Tschaggeny v. Union Pacific Land Resources Corp., 555 P.2d 277,
280-81 (Utah 1976). Plaintiff the Trust essentially conceded at the end of trial that it did not
have evidence of the existence of a roadway across tme Park Property at the time of severance in
1964. Accordingly judgment should be entered in fajvor of defendants the Parks on plaintiff the
Trust's claim for easement by implication.
3. The Trust asserts the right to use the roadway ("the dike") across the northern edge of
the Park Property pursuant to a claimed right of easement by necessity. The requirements to
establish an easement by necessity were set forth in tschaggeny, supra, 197 P.2d at 280-81 as
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follows:
[A] way of necessity arises where there is a conveyance of part of a tract of land
which is so situated that either the part convened or the part retained is surrounded
with no access to a road to the outer world, Ih either case, there is an implied
grant or reservation of a way across the part riot:so surrounded unless it clearly
appears that the parties to the conveyance did] not intend such an easement,
However, it is not necessary that the easement be visible, apparent, or obvious,
There is no implied grant where the instrument of conveyance specifically
provides for a way over the parcel not land lopked,
4. Under the law set forth in Tschaggeny the Trust is not entitled to an easement by
necessity over the Park Property for the following reisons
r
a. To establish an easement by necessity under Utah law the land
conveyed following the severance must be sjirrounded with no access to a road to
the outer world". IcL No witness testified as to the conditions existent on August
1, 1964; the date of severance. The court is ujnaware as to whether there was a
road from the Trust Property to the outer worl d as of August 1, 1964. Presumably
no witness with knowledge or other evidence! was available to the Trust regarding
the conditions on the ground forty five years ^go; at the time the Smith's severed
the Park Property from the property it sold to RKR. The court thus cannot make a
finding as to whether the eighty acre parcel on ginally conveyed to RKR (of which
the Trust Property is a part) was landlocked aft the time of severance. Because the
Trust is the plaintiff in this action it bears the burden of proof. In the absence of
such evidence this court is required to rule in favor of the Parks on that issue.1
b. Under Utah law an easement by necessity iis not created where it
"clearly appears that the parties to the conveyance did not intend such an
easement." Id. In this case Deed "B contained a grant of a thirty foot easement
from the County road across the 240 acre RKR parcel to the northwest comer of
the parcel conveyed in Deed "B". Because at] the time of severance there were
two deeds from the Smiths to RKR (Deed "Af ' and Deed "B") rather than just one;

1

There was evidence presented to the court g<oing back to at least 1975 that roads existed
through the RKR property that led to the Trust Property. The court presumes those roads also
existed in 1964 and long before. However, in the absence of direct evidence on that point the
court cannot make such a finding.
10
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and because the land in Deed "B" was on the pme day subsequently conveyed to
the three individuals (B. Gary Smith, Gary K. Watson and Oliver D. LeFevre);
and because the thirty foot easement granted 1ft Deed "B" went to the northwest
corner of the property conveyed in "Deed "B r I, Deed "B" evidences clear intent on
the part of the parties to the severance that the) express easement granted in "Deed
"B" was the intended means of access to the fighty acre parcel conveyed in Deed
"B". A portion of that parcel is now the Trusl] Property.
Deed "B" which contains the express ^asement clearly demonstrates the
parties to the original severance did not inten4 the reservation of an easement
across the Park Property; but rather an easement across the larger RKR parcel,
c. The existence of the express thirty foot right of way easement from the
County Road across the RKR Property to the jiorthwest corner of the Watson
Property (which also benefits and gives accesi to the Trust Property) necessarily
results in the conclusion that the Trust Property is not landlocked and was not
landlocked at the time of severance. Under Utah law an easement by necessity, by
its very nature, only comes into existence if the severed property is landlocked.
5. The Trust asserts the need to cross the nortlhern portion of the Park Property because
routes across the RKR Property are "impassable5 However, the court has been cited to no case
law or other authority suggesting the conveyance of an<express easement (or even the creation of
an easement by necessity) guarantees more than a "legal •righf'of access. Under Utah law a
grantee can grant an express right of way easement wlithout an accompanying legal duty to build
a passable road. Indeed for the creation of an easement by necessity "it is not necessary that the
easement be visible, apparent, or obvious". Id at 28(1) 81.
In addition there was ample evidence presented at trial of which this court accepts
establishing the fact the Trust Property is accessible *y more than one route across the RKR
Property. In addition, at the time of severance, the rojadway ("the dike") across the Park Property
was not even in existence. The dike was first authorized in 1977 to 1979 and was constructed in
11
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1980. Crossing the Park Property would have been just as impassable at the time of severance as
crossing the RKR Property is today. A roadway, if needed, can be constructed across the RKR
property just the same as the road across the Park Property was constructed.
Moreover this court finds, based on the testimony of Jim Park, that a road currently exists
tluough the RKR property that leads to the Carr Property and ends in the very same location that
the road across the northern boundary of the Park Property leads; which is the road the Trust
seeks to access.
Accordingly judgment should be entered in faj^or of defendants the Parks on plaintiff the
Trust's claim for easement by necessity.
6. The Trust claims the insertion of the described express thirty foot easement across the
RKR Property in Deed "B" was a mistake; and that iristead an easement was intended to be
created in favor of the Trust's predecessors in interest] across the Park Property. The Trust seeks
reformation of the deed to create such an easement, "the court does not accept the Trust's
assertion for the following reasons: (1) there was no ejvidence presented at trial as to the intent of
the original grantor; (2) the express wording of Deed 'B" actually benefits the Trust and its
predecessors and successors in interest; (3) there was Ino other deed or other conveyance
document executed at the time of severance in which to insert a different easement grant; and (4)
there are no facts to suggest an easement across the:north of the Park Property would have been
more preferable to the original grantor and grantees tljian
*
an easement across the RKR Property.
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This court concludes based on all of the evidence presented that the original parties at the
time of severance intended to grant an express easement across the RKR Property.2 That
easement benefits plaintiff the Trust and the Trust Prcjperty. That easement together with the
Trust's express easement across the Watson Property |and the Carr Property grants to the Trust
right to access the Trust Property from
and its predecessors and successors in interest the legal
1
the County Road and through the RKR Property.3
The Trust also alleges that in the interest ofpiibl:ic policy, conservation and saving money
the Trust should be allowed to use the existing road;across the Park Property rather than having
to construct or improve another route. Accepting sucft argument would no doubt benefit the
Trust and may or may not benefit the public in general . The result however would contravene
the Parks' protected private property rights.
Accordingly judgment should be entered in faVor of defendants the Parks on plaintiff the
Trust's claim for express easement by reformation of Ideed.
7. To the extent any of the above Conclusion^ of Law are in actuality findings of fact

"There was no evidence the Smiths intended aft easement across their property (The Park
Property) at the time of severance. If such were their intent there would have been no need for
the easement subsequently granted to Bud R. Allen.
3

At trial the Trust asserted its contention that the location of the express thirty foot
easement across the RKR Propeity passes directly alojn]g the southern border of the RKR Property
which abuts the northern borders of the Park Property[, the Carr Property, the Trust Property and
the Watson Property. Although it appears incontrovertible an easement exists across the RKR
Property in favor of the Trust, the exact location of thjat easement is a subject for a different legal
proceeding.
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they are so denominated.
8. Mr. Michael W. Park is assigned to prepar^ an appropriate Judgment and Decree
based upon these Findings of Fact and Conclusions o Law and submit to the court for signature.
DATED this _6_ day of Mardh 2010.

^NT^
MARVIN D BAGLEY
District Court Judge

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Findings of fact and Conclusions of Law was mailed
to the following on the _g_day of March 2010.
Michael W. Park
THE PARK FIRM PC
315 West Hilton Drive, Suite 4
St. George, Utah 84770

Vincent C. Rampton
JONES WALDO HOLBOOK &
MCDONOUGH PC
Attorneys for Plaintiff
170 South Main Street, Suite 1500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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Michael W.Park (2516)
THE PARK FIRM, P.C.
315 West Hilton Drive, Suite 4
St. George, UT 84770
Telephone: (435) 673-8689
Facsimile: (435) 673*8767
Attorney for Defendants
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR KANE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE ABRAHAM & ASSOCIATES TRUST
MICHAEL ROBERT BARKER, Trustee,

JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,

vs.
JAMES M. PARK AND TORI L. PARK,

Civil No. 060600022
Judge: Marvin D. Bagley

Defendants.

The above entitled matter was tried by the Court on January 26,2010. The
Abraham & Associates Trust, Michael Robert Barker, trustee (hereafter "the Trust") was
represented by Vincent C. Rampton, of the law firm of Jones, Waldo, Holbrook &
Judgment
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McDotiough PC. Although trustee Michael Robert Barker was not present at trial, the
parties stipulated that Sylvester Mark Hulet had authority to act on behalf of the Trust.
Defendants James M. Park and Tori L. Park (hereafter "the Parks") were represented by
Michael W. Park, of The Park Firm, P.C. Defendants Dennis Carr and Donette Carr
(hereafter "the Carrs") previously stipulated with,the Trust for entry of a decree resolving
all issues between the Trust and the Carrs. An Order of Quiet Title and Dismissal based
on the stipulation was entered by Judge David L. Mower on October 6,2006, dismissing
the Carrs from this action.
The Court having heard the evidence presented and the arguments of counsel and
being fully advised in the premises and having made itsfindingsof fact and conclusions
of law, now makes the following judgment.
1.

The Trust's claim for a prescriptive easement across the Parks property is

denied and judgment is entered in favor on the defendants, the Parks, and against the
Trust on the Trust's claim for easement by prescription.
2.

The Trust's claim for an easement by implication across the Parks property

is denied and judgment is entered in favor of the defendants, the Parks, and against the
Trust on the Trust's claim for easement by implication.
3.

The Trust's claim for an easement by necessity across the Paries property is
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denied, and judgment is entered in favor of defendants, the Parks, and against the Trust
on the Trust claim for easement by necessity.
4.

The Trust's claim for reformation of the deed, to establish an express

easement across the Parks property, is denied and judgment should be entered in favor of
the defendants, the Parks, and against the Trust on the Trust's claim for reformation of
deed to grant an express easement across the Parks property,
DATED t h i s ^ \ V day of

[^^A

, 2010,

WBSBSBm
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FACSIMILE & MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the j ^ f f l a y of April, 2010,1, by facsimile, sent a true and
correct copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT, and also mailed said Judgment, first class,
postage prepaid, by U.S. mail to the following attorney, who was notified that this
Judgment had not been submitted to the Court and will be held for eight (8) days to
determine if there is an objection to the form of the Judgment. If no objection is received
within eight (8) daysfromthe date of mailing, the Judgment will be submitted to the
Court for signature.
Vincent C. Rampton
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK &. MCDONOUGH, PC
170 S Main Street, Suite 1500
Salt Lake City UT 84101
Fax: 801-328-0537

Judgment
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
KANE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE ABRAHAM & ASSOCIATES TRUST,
MICHAEL ROBERT BARKER, Trustee,
Plaintiff,

.

vs.

;
;
>
;I

ORDER DENYING
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

>

JAMES M. PARK AND TORI L. PARK, and
DENNIS CARR AND DONETTE CARR,
Defendants.

;
;)

Civil No. 060600022

')

Judge Marvin D Bagley

AfinalJudgment was entered by the court in this case on April 21,2010; following a trial
to the court held on January 26,2010. On May 5,2010 plaintiff The Abraham & Associates
Trust filed a Motion For New Trial pursuant to Rule 59 (a)(7) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
The parties filed supporting and opposing memoranda and the motion was argued to the court on
November 4,2010. Following the hearing the court took the motion under advisement.
Rule 59(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states: "A motion for a new trial shall be served
not later that 10 days after the entry of the judgment." The terms of the rule are mandatory and
jurisdictional. In Burgers v. Maiben, 652 P.2d 1320,1321 (Utah 1982) the Utah Supreme Court
stated:
Under Utah R. Civ. P. 59(b), a party must serve a motion for a new trial on
the opposing party within 10 daysfromthe entry of the judgment. The serving of
such a motion suspends from running the one-month period in which a party
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usually has to file a notice of appeal with this Court pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P.
73(a). After disposition of a timely motion for a new trial, the time for filing a
notice of appeal resumes running.
In the present case, 25 days passed after entry of thefinaljudgment before the
defendant served a copy of his motion for a new trial and a supporting affidavit on
the plaintiffs. When such an untimely motion is made, the trial court's only
alternative is to deny the motion, Hulson v. Atchison T. & S.R Railway Co., 289
F.2d 726 (7th Cir. 1961), which the trial court did in this case. See also, Holbrook
v. Hodson, 24 Utah 2d 120,466 P.2d 843 (1970). (Emphasis added).
In this case the Motion for New Trial wasfiledmore than ten days after the entry of
Judgment. Under the Utah Supreme Court's holding in Burgers this court's only alternative is to
deny the motion.
Accordingly plaintiff s Motion for New Trial is denied.

fc-

DATED thisSU
day of December 2010.
#

J2±s±

a

tRVIN D B7CGLEY
District Court Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Denying Motion for New Trial was mailed to
the following on the £ day of©eeemfeer 201 $.

~^~
Vincent C. Rampton
JONES WALDO HOLBOOK &
MCDONOUGH PC
Attorneys for Plaintiff
170 South Main Street, Suite 1500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Jm
Michael W. Park
THE PARK FIRM PC
315 West Hilton Drive, Suite 4
St. George, Utah 84770
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Fl? r^in

Vincent C. Rampton (USB 2684)
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH PC
170 South Main Street, Suite 1500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 521-3200
Fax: (801)328-0537
Email: vrampton@joneswaldo.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff'

»

a i»v^, ii^g, &&,

KANE COUNTY
JAN 0 7 Z011

m THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF KANE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

THE ABRAHAM & ASSOCIATES TRUST,
MICHAEL ROBERT BARKER, Trustee,
NOTICE OF APPEAL

Plaintiff,
VS.

JAMES M. PARK AND TORI L. PARK, arid " " \
DENNIS CARR AND DONETTE CARR,
individuals,

Civil No. 060600022
Judge Marvin D. Bagley

Defendants.

Plaintiff Abraham & Associates Trust, Michael Robert Barker, Trustee, hereby appeals to
the Utah Supreme Courtfromthe trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law dated
May 8, 2010; the trial court's Judgment entered April 21, 2010; and the trial court's Order
Denying Motion for New Trial entered December 30, 2010, in the above-entitled action.
DATED this K 1 ^ day of January, 2011.
o HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH PC

Vincent C. Rampton
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice of
Appeal was mailed via first class mail, postage prepaid, to the following t h i s V ^ ^ day of
January, 2011:
Michael W. Park
The Park Firm PC
315 West Hilton Drive, #4
St. George, UT 84770
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Vincent C. Rampton (USB 2684)
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH PC
170 South Main Street, Suite 1500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 521-3200
Fax: (801)328-0537
Email: vrampton@ioneswaldo.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF KANE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

THE ABRAHAM & ASSOCIATES TRUST,
MICHAEL ROBERT BARKER, Trustee,
Plaintiff,

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL

vs.
JAMES M. PARK AND TORI L. PARK, and
DENNIS CARR AND DONETTE CARR,
individuals,

Civil No. 060600022
1

Judge Marvin D. Bagley

Defendants.

Plaintiff Abraham & Associates Trust, Michael Robert Barker, Trustee, hereby appeals to
the Utah Supreme Courtfromthe trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law dated
March 8, 2010; the trial court's Judgment entered April 21, 2010; and the trial court's Order
Denying Motion for New Trial entered December 30, 2010, in the above-entitled action. This
Amended Notice of Appeal supersedes the Notice of Appeal filed January 4, 2011 herein, which
erroneously stated that the trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law herein were
entered May 8, 2011.
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DATED this 24th day of January, 2011.
JONES WALDO HOLBBTOOK & McDONOUGH PC

By:
*Vmcent C. Rampton
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Amended
Notice of Appeal was mailed via first class mail, postage prepaid, to the following this 24th day
of January, 2011:
Michael W. Park
The Park Firm PC
315 West Hilton Drive, #4
St. George, UT 84770
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